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Abstract
We propose a novel approach that embeds Rational Expectations (RE) into a lowdimensional structural vector autoregression (SVAR). We establish an instrumental
variable procedure internal to the SVAR founded on a purely theoretical framework,
which does not rely on any mapping strategy to a reduced form. Alternatively, a
separate strategy considers data external to the SVAR to aid in the identification of
structural shocks on a purely empirical basis. We report clouds of responses from
an RE-consistent theoretical model as well as regions of plausible responses from the
empirical approach. We conclude that a Taylor Rule characterization of monetary
policy shocks remains relevant when the theoretical RE-SVAR is properly augmented
with information from fluctuations—or momentous events—in markets that garnered
increased attention since 2008, such as reserves and various money markets.
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Introduction

Far from a typical economic disruption, the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 proved to
have lasting ramifications for the conduct and transmission of monetary policy shocks. The
conventional view for these shocks over the previous two decades called for a characterization
based on the Taylor Rule. In accordance with this rule, the Federal Reserve lowered the target federal funds rate to its effective lower bound (ELB) of zero in response to deteriorating
economic conditions in late 2008.
The following decade saw the Federal Reserve turning to what became generally known
as unconventional monetary policy (UMP) comprising: (i) liquidity injections into the financial system through novel facilities, (ii) engaging in large-scale asset purchases and balance
sheet unwinds, and (iii) adopting forward guidance in its own communications to the public
so as to better anchor market expectations.
In this historical context, structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models of monetary
policy should address (i) the important role of expectations in this period and (ii) the role
a Taylor Rule retains in a protracted near-zero interest rate environment. On the first
point, the revolutionary work of Lucas (1972) has had lasting implications on macroeconomic
modeling. Whereas dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are essentially
founded on rational expectations (RE), SVAR models’ connection with RE has typically been
more ephemeral. Regarding the second point, an important question to address is whether
SVARs can preserve the relevance of a Taylor Rule—when accompanied by a Phillips curve
(P C) and investment-savings (IS) equations—for this period.
This paper proposes a novel SVAR approach that directly embeds expectations into a
low-dimensional “consensus model,” which we refer to as “textbook.” Alternatively, we consider a separate data-driven strategy that looks to information external to the SVAR to aid
identification. This permits comparison between a purely theoretical and purely empirical
identification of monetary policy shocks through the lens of theoretical clouds of impulse
response functions versus empirical sets of responses. Finally, we combine both approaches
and conclude that a theoretical model—when augmented with identification strategies surrounding events that took place during the GFC and UMP periods—salvages or at least
sustains the relevance of the Taylor Rule for characterizing monetary policy shocks in a
modern sample.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
modeling RE in DSGE and SVAR models. Section 3 establishes some notation to distinguish the theoretical and the empirical methodologies we advance. Section 4 describes our
procedure for embedding RE directly into an SVAR and presents results from this purely
theoretical approach. Section 5 proposes overlaying various (size/event/external variable)
restrictions to the RE-SVAR of the previous section. Section 6 discusses results from this
augmentation of the purely theoretical model by overlaying the added restrictions proposed.
Section 7 outlines the purely empirical approach imposing the same overlaying restrictions
applied to the theoretical RE-SVAR. Section 8 presents results from the empirical approach
and Section 9 concludes.

2

A Fundamental Disconnect in the Modeling of Rational Expectations: DSGEs vs. SVARs

Beginning with Blanchard and Khan (1980), there has been a large literature on the methodology for solving linear rational expectation models. Binder et al. (1995), Binder and Pesaran
(1997), Klein (2000), Sims (2002) among others, paved the way for incorporating RE into
DSGE models. These models typically begin with a canonical multivariate single equation
relating variables of interest (say, xt ) to their expected future paths Et xt+1 , as well as other
exogenous variables and shocks (ϵt ). Importantly, variables in xt may not generally be observable. This is a broad and general framework capable of accommodating high-dimensional
models. Therefore, the RE groundwork that underwrites the DSGE approach has great potential for describing a dizzying array of economic dynamics.
Conversely, given that VAR models are inherently “backward-looking,” SVARs are generally ill-equipped to accommodate RE.1 Partly, in an effort to address the backwardlookingness of VARs, a relatively small literature has engaged in looking for conditions
under which the state-space framework that underwrites many DSGEs can be mapped into
a VAR/VARMA representation (see Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2007), Ravenna (2007),
Morris (2016), Morris (2017), and Martı́nez-Garcı́a (2020) as a non-exhaustive list.) This
is an admirable pursuit, which continues to grow. However, this mapping approach never
scales from a VAR with expectations into a DSGE. Instead, these methodologies largely
begin from a higher-dimensional RE-DSGE to a lower-dimensional VAR representation that
1

A notable exception is Keating (1990).
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would not accommodate RE unless: a moving average process were also appended, lags were
truncated, or some algebraic mechanism for dimension reductionality were advanced.
A prototypical n-variable SVAR begins with the data from which reduced-form residuals are extracted. Subsequently, the researcher appeals to economic theory, some market
mechanism(s) or empirical regularities about the data for help to pin down a mapping matrix connecting the residuals to some semblance of economic interpretation. Responsible
researchers will not want to conclude their assumptions2 so dynamics that are imposed by
construction are often de-emphasized in favor of results that are driven by the combination
of the researcher’s identifying restrictions and the data. Thus, the data hopefully yields
insight on economic dynamics and the identifying restrictions yield a credible identification
of economic (a.k.a structural) shocks.
Differences of opinion among researchers may arise on various market mechanisms, theoretical models, or even the importance of empirical regularities. Therefore, far from incontrovertible, identification schemes are always debatable. An important aspect of the suitability
of a given identifying restriction scheme rests on its ability to render orthogonalization of
the innovations in the system. Thus, much of the SVAR analysis centers on satisfying arguments that propitiate a lack of contemporaneous correlations among shocks. Importantly,
the orthogonality of shocks is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the identification
of VAR innovations as structural shocks.3
Some approaches discipline the SVAR identification with a theoretical model that is estimated a priori. Conclusions drawn from the theory are then incorporated ex-post as a
rationalization for a plausible parameterization of the requisite elements in, say, some impact matrix. Other common practices include calibrating or estimating a DSGE model and
subsequently looking for restrictions that match (or minimize the distance between) the impulse responses of a VAR to those of the DSGE, as well as finding conditions under which a
DSGE can be represented as an SVAR (see various references cited above on this point).

2
3

See Uhlig (2005) for a cautionary tale surrounding sign restrictions in this context.
For example, if a restriction scheme had credibly identified innovations from a bivariate VAR as struc-

tural—say nominal versus real—shocks, appending a white noise process as a third shock would almost surely
guarantee orthogonality. Yet attributing an economic interpretation to this third shock and considering it
structural for the economy would strain credulity.

4

We propose an identification strategy founded on RE that is directly derived—rather
than loosely mapped—from a theoretical construct. Incorporating RE in a VAR setting
often involves mapping a theoretical model through a restriction strategy of a reduced-form
(statistical) VAR. In a first, we insert the theoretical model directly into a VAR construct
without the need for pinning down the n(n−1)/2 requisite elements in a matrix that connects
statistical innovations to structural shocks. In other words, our approach does not involve
the common practice of estimating a statistical VAR and then imposing a restriction scheme.
Instead, we never deal with a reduced-form VAR. Our VAR construct begins with structural
shock identification out of the gate. Thus, it is structural from the outset.4 The most important benefit we can see is that it allows us to model forward-looking behavior directly
within the VAR. Forward-looking agents are a typical assumption in theoretical macroeconomic models, but standard VARs are (mathematically speaking) backward-looking. Most
analyses require clever identification strategies as well as external proxies/instruments from
survey data to overlay “forward-lookingness” of the theoretical model to the “backwardlookingness” of the statistical model. Our approach allows us to circumvent this disconnect.
Another advantage of our approach—over many DSGEs—for identifying RE-consistent
structural shocks is that our RE-SVAR method does not require adding unobservables to
the information set. Therefore, there is no need for casting the model into state space. If
the setup does not require unobserved state variables, there is no need to specify a transition equation. The ensuing measurement equation is fully observed, which accommodates
low-dimensional modeling in a way that DSGEs cannot typically achieve.

4

The validity of a reduced-form VAR is rarely called into question for assessing the suitability of a model.

Rather, the scrutiny typically rests on the restriction strategy itself. Thus, if the restriction scheme is
doubted, one may call into question the mapping of the innovations to the structural shocks. Our approach,
however, does not rely on such mapping. The scrutiny here must rest on the suitability of our theoretical
construct. For example, if one did not believe in a consensus AS-IS-M P model, or if one did not believe in
the particular characterization of the Taylor Rule we employ, then our approach would be a non-starter.

5
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A Unified Identification Framework:
Motivating Theoretical and Empirical Restrictions

Consider the following n-variable statistical VAR of order p:
xt =

p
X

Bi xt−i + et

(1)

i=1

with reduced-form parameters stacked into B = (vec(B1 )′ ...vec(Bp )′ )′ and statistical
inovations et ∼ (0, Ωe ). The covariance matrix of residuals can be decomposed according to
Ωe = P P ′ , where P is the unique lower triangular Cholesky factor with nonnegative diagonal
elements. Let A denote an invertible matrix that relates the reduced-form innovations
et = (e1t , e2t , ..., ent )′ to a set of structural shocks ϵt = (ϵ1t , ϵ2t , ..., ϵnt )′ . SVAR models provide a
simple framework that enables researchers to quantify macroeconomic effects of disturbances
without a full characterization, from first principles, of all the theoretical laws of motion
involved. The prototypical n-variable SVAR analysis rests on attaining sufficient information
about the matrix A that uniquely maps a set of reduced-form statistical innovations et ,
stemming from the data, to a set of mutually uncorrelated economic shocks εt :
et = Aεt

(2)

The B̂i coefficients can be estimated from the reduced-form VAR and the sample residuals eˆt (B̂) in (1) are consistent estimates of et . Given that the A matrix contains n2 elements
and the covariance matrix of the residuals eˆt estimated in (1) only provides information from
n(n + 1)/2 elements, identification of all the shocks in the system requires placing assumptions on n(n − 1)/2 elements, leaving the rest of the A matrix to be estimated from the data.
We depart from this standard approach by considering two cases. One case involves
imposing fewer than n(n − 1)/2 restrictions for a system that cannot guarantee point identification of responses. We refer to this as a purely empirical identification scheme. The
other case is based on writing a fully specified theoretical model. In principle, this approach
could potentially be consistent with full knowledge of the mapping matrix. We denote this
theoretic mapping matrix as A+ to differentiate it from the A matrix, which only requires
knowledge of a portion of the total number of its elements. We refer to this as the purely
theoretical identification scheme and we formulate it to be consistent with a particular specification of an RE model.
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We denote restriction schemes founded on theoretical constructs as F̄ to distinguish them
from other types of restrictions collectively represented as Ḡ. Importantly, the theoretical
construct is conditioned on what would be consistent with an identification strategy based
on full knowledge of the mapping matrix A+ . Thus, our proposed strategy conditioned on
a full specification of the structural parameters guarantees a unique realization of impulse
responses stemming from F̄ (A+ ). We compare our approach to restrictions schemes Ḡ(A)
that do not yield point identification.5 These latter types of restrictions obtain non-unique
solutions giving rise to large sets of impulse responses that require further winnowing to be
informative. Thus, we consider a spectrum from a purely theoretical identification restriction (F̄ (A+ )) to a purely statistical one (Ḡ(A)). We offer some elaboration on trade-offs
between the two approaches below.
When combining this expression (2) with the data, implicit regularity conditions about
the nature of covariances yield information on n(n + 1)/2 elements of the n x n matrix A.
Therefore, insofar as this (2) mapping is informative, it acts as a restriction, albeit mild, of
the parameter space—a point emphasized by Ludvigson et al. (2021) who refer to this as
a covariance restriction. For a given identification scheme Z, let ḠZ (A) denote this mild
covariance restriction as follows:
ḠZ (A) ≡ vech(Ω̂e ) − vech(AA′ ) = 0

(3)

where the operator vech(•) stacks the lower-triangular elements of a symmetric n x n
matrix into a single vector of length n(n + 1)/2. This covariance restriction is not enough
for structural identification as there can be infinitely-many solutions that satisfy ḠZ (A)=0.
Let this set of empirical solutions be collected into:
ÂE = {A, diag(A) ≥ 0, ḠZ (A) = 0}

(4)

Similarly, let a set of theoretical solutions be collected into:
ÂT = {A+ , diag(A+ ) ≥ 0, F̄ (A+ )}

(5)

Both the theoretical and empirical solutions may yield large sets of impulse responses,
which will subsequently be disciplined further with a set of overlaying restrictions. These
overlaying restrictions could be useful if they help narrow down the response sets. Conversely,
these added restrictions may be uninformative if: (i ) they do not serve to winnow out the
response region enough for a qualitative assessment of the direction of response, or (ii ) if the
5

See Ludvigson et al. (2021) for a similar setup.
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winnowing is so extreme that it yields an empty set of possible responses. Importantly, a
restriction scheme that sufficiently thins out the region of responses does not guarantee that
the restriction itself is sensible. Solutions that satisfy the constraints can be found to exist
and still yield nonsensical conclusions. Any overlaying response that serves to narrow out
the set of solutions to AE (or AT ) can still be debatable on empirical or theoretical grounds.
We first discuss the theoretical solutions ÂT by elaborating on a specification based on
F̄ (A+ ). For notational ease, we simply refer to the theoretical framework as F̄ with the
understanding that this identification strategy is based on the full knowledge of the system.
Later in the paper we discuss the approach for the empirical solutions ÂE .

4

A Structural VAR Framework Consistent with Rational Expectations

Our restriction strategy F̄ is premised on a theoretical construct described in equations
4.7—4.10 below. We consider a VAR specification, which consists of four variables, measured at monthly frequencies, stacked in xt = [it , πt , yt , bt , ]′ where it is the monthly average of
the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow effective federal funds rate, πt is the annualized inflation rate
from the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index, yt is the natural log of industrial
production, and bt is the Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) excess bond premium (EBP).6

4.1

A Purely Theoretical ÂT Identification Framework

We propose an identification strategy that pins down shocks to the monetary policy indicator with a method that does not rely on a Cholesky decomposition. Instead, our proposed
technique orders the policy function first in the system. We leverage a simple application
of the RE methodology to find a statistical relationship between the reduced-form innovations in the policy equation and the associated structural shocks. Once we have isolated
the monetary policy shock, we can obtain dynamic effects for the short-term rate, inflation,
output, and excess bond premia. These shocks may subsequently be used as an instrument
to identify other structural parameters from our model, which in turn allows us to pin down
6

We report results from a monthly sample encompassing 1988:m10—2020:m2.
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other structural shocks.7
This setup poses a novel (internal) instrumental variable methodology for modeling rational expectations directly in a structural VAR setting. The typical approach estimates a
reduced-form VAR first, and then advocates a mapping to the structural shock of interest.
In a way congruent with the persuasive descriptions in Arias et al. (2019), the approach in
our paper (as in many other VAR applications) must deal with the joint problem of VAR
modeling: statistical uncertainty and model uncertainty. In essence, our VAR construct takes
model uncertainty off the table. We begin with the assumption that the structural model
we generate responses from is appropriate (if it is not, it renders the whole enterprise a nonstarter). Contingent on this “accepted” structure, we generate impulse responses by directly
imposing values on the structural parameters in what becomes a pseudo-calibration exercise.
Each response we report is a separate realization of a distinctly identified structural VAR.
This allows us to produce a “cloud” of structural responses, each of which is unique8 for a
given value of the structural parameters.
Consider the following structural VAR
A0 xt =

p
X

Ai xt−i + εt

(4.6)

i=1

where p is the number of lags and where E(εt ε′t ) is a diagonal covariance matrix of the
structural shocks.
7

Our methodology describes a way to identify monetary policy (M P ) shocks first. We use some of that

information to subsequently identify investment-savings (IS) shocks. Then, information derived from the
identification of M P and IS can be leveraged to identify the third innovation as an aggregate supply (AS)
shock. Finally, armed with shocks in M P , IS, and AS, we identify bond risk (BR) shocks. While this paper
limits the application of our approach only to M P shocks, identification of the remaining shocks remains
crucial for the various overlaying restrictions schemes to monetary policy that we subsequently consider.
8
This voids the need for the construction of confidence bounds. While ours is a frequentist approach,
Inoue and Kilian (2020) argue against constructing confidence bounds around median responses in Bayesian
VARs. They also advance the notion of reporting clouds of responses to denote a credible set.
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The structural model consists of four equations:
P
it = ϕπ Et πt+hπ + ϕy Et yt+hy + AM P (L)xt−1 + εM
t

(4.7)

yt = Et yt+1 − α1 (it − Et πt+1 ) + AIS (L)xt−1 + εIS
t

(4.8)

πt = α2 Et πt+1 + α3 yt + AAS (L)xt−1 + εAS
t

(4.9)

bt = α4 Et bt+1 + α5 (it − Et πt+1 ) + α6 Et yt+1 + ABR (L)xt−1 + εBR
t

(4.10)

where hπ and hy refer to the number of forward-looking horizons in the policy reaction
function to inflation and output, respectively, and AM P , AIS , AAS , and ABR are the autoregressive matrices containing the structural parameters.
Let the reduced-form VAR in companion form be given by Xt = βXt−1 + Det where
Xt = [x′t , x′t−1 , ..., x′t−p−1 ]′ is np × 1, and D = (In , 0n , . . . , 0n )′ is np × n and


B1 B2 · · · Bq−1 Bq


 In


β =  0n
 .
 ..

0n

0n · · ·

0n

In · · ·
.. . .
.
.

0n
..
.

0n · · ·

In




0n 

0n 
.
.. 
. 

0n

is np × np. The matrix In is an n × n identity matrix and the matrix 0n is an n × n matrix
of zeros.
Define a selection vector Sv such that
Sv Xt = vt

(4.11)

where vt is some component of Xt (such as it , πt , yt , or bt , in our model above). We can
forecast, or rationally expect the movement of a given variable using the VAR:
Et vt+j = Et Sv Xt+j = Sv β j Xt

(4.12)

Equation (4.12) follows from the fact that, via recursive substitution, it can be shown that
Xt+j = β j Xt + β j−1 et−1 + β j−2 et+2 + · · · + et+j . Given equation (4.12), along with the
companion form of the reduced-form VAR, and the assumption that Et et+i = 0 for i > 0,
the following equation holds:
Et−1 vt+j = Et−1 Sv Xt+j = Sv β j Et−1 Xt = Sv β j βXt−1 ,
10

it is, then, straightforward to show the expectational, or forecast, revision is given by:
Et vt+j − Et−1 vt+j = Sv β j Xt − Sv β j βXt−1 = Sv β j (Xt − βXt−1 ) = Sv β j Det

(4.13)

We use this general result to identify the structural VAR model defined above. We will
use a sequential instrumental variable estimation strategy.

4.1.1

Monetary Policy Shocks

Taking a stand on the coefficients in the first equation, we can derive the monetary policy
shocks by expressing them as a linear combination of the reduced form residuals without
estimating any structural parameters. The policy feedback rule is given by:
P
it = ϕπ Et πt+h + ϕy Et yt+h2 + AM P (L)xt−1 + εM
t

(4.14)

Rewriting the (4.14) equation in expectational difference form and subtracting the expectation of the policy rule at time t − 1 from (4.14) yields:
P
it − Et−1 it = ϕπ (Et πt+h − Et−1 πt+h ) + ϕy (Et yt+h2 − Et−1 yt+h2 ) + εM
t

(4.15)

We can then use equation (4.13) to find expressions in the expectational difference in
the above equation, and solving for the structural shock in the interest rate feedback rule
obtains the following:
P
εM
= eit − (ϕπ Sπ β h Det )′ − (ϕy Sπ β h2 Det )′
t

4.1.2

(4.16)

IS Shocks

Similar to the analysis above, taking Et−1 of the IS equation and subtracting it from the IS
equation renders the following expectational difference:
yt − Et−1 yt = Et yt+1 − Et−1 yt+1 − α1 ((it − Et−1 it ) − (Et πt+1 − Et−1 πt+1 )) + εIS
t

(4.17)

We can then use Equation (4.13) to find expressions for the expectational differences in
the above equation:
eyt = (Sy βDet )′ − α1 (eit − (Sπ βDet )′ ) + εIS
t

(4.18)

We can rewrite this as a linear equation with slope coefficient α1 :
eyt − (Sy βDet )′ = −α1 (eit − (Sπ βDet )′ ) + εIS
t
11

(4.19)

Given that the error term in this equation may be correlated with et in general, and eit in
particular, OLS estimates of α1 will generally be biased. However, leveraging (4.16), we can
P
as an instrument (correlated with eit but uncorrelated with εIS
use εM
t ) to gain unbiased
t

estimates of α1 . Once this is done, a time series for εIS
t can be recovered.

4.1.3

AS Shocks

Repeating the analysis yet again, we have the following expectational difference for the AS
equation:
πt − Et−1 πt = α2 (Et πt+1 − Et−1 πt+1 ) + α3 (yt − Et−1 yt ) + εAS
t
Once more, we can apply equation (4.13) to find expressions in the expectational difference in the above equation:
eπt = α2 (Sπ βDet )′ + α3 eyt + εAS
t

(4.20)

This is a linear equation with slope coefficients α2 and α3 . Again, OLS estimates of α2 and
P
and εIS
α3 from this equation will generally be biased, but we can use εM
t as instruments
t

to gain unbiased estimates of the coefficients. Once this is done, a time series of εAS
can be
t
obtained.

4.1.4

BR Shocks

Finally, we can apply equation (4.13) to ultimately arrive at an equation for the structural
shock to the excess bond premium as follows:
εBR
= ebt − α4 (Sb βDet )′ + α5 (eit − Sπ βDet )′ − α6 (Sy βDet )′
t

(4.21)

Given the possible bias in the estimates of α4 , α5 , and α6 that may result from the
endogeneity of ebt , eit and et more generally, we conduct two-stage least squares using the
identified structural shocks to the previous equations as instruments. In the first stage, we
estimate three regressions, one for each of the three terms in brackets in equation (4.21),
and derive three OLS coefficients. In the second stage, we regress the residuals ebt from the
fourth equation on the combinations of the first-stage estimates and the structural shocks
to obtain sample estimates for αˆ4 , αˆ5 , and αˆ6 . A time series for εBR
can then be generated
t
by replacing the coefficients α4 , α5 , and α6 with their corresponding sample estimates.

12

4.1.5

Structural Shocks to the System

This framework for sequentially constructing structural shocks in this system provides a way
to specify an SVAR that is consistent with rational expectations (RE-SVAR). Our methodology allows us to produce impulse response functions to all four shocks in the system.
While we focus our attention exclusively on monetary policy shocks, recovering the full set
of structural shocks remains crucial—particularly when we consider overlaying restrictions
that exploit the empirical characteristics of these other shocks as a way to augment our
identification strategy with empirical restrictions.

4.2

Operationalizing the RE-SVAR Framework

Our restriction strategy F̄ is premised on a theoretical construct described in equation (4.16),
P
which shows a way to construct a series of structural (εM
) shocks. Rather than estimating
t

values of the structural parameters in equation (4.14), we opt for a pseudo calibration apP
proach. Given a time series construction of εM
as described in the previous section, along
t

with given values for ϕπ , ϕy , and a given hπ and hy , we can compute a unique realization of
P
. Throughout the analysis, we consider an
the responses of variables in xt to shocks in εM
t

exogenous standard deviation increase in the federal funds rate, substituting it with the Wu
and Xia (2016) shadow rate for those periods when the ELB binds.
P
We proceed as follows. We produce a response for each variable of interest to an εM
t

shock by imposing a value for ϕπ , ϕy , hπ , and hy . We record the response and repeat
the analysis. We iterate over a relatively fine grid search of values for these parameters.
We let the ϕπ coefficient cycle between values of zero and five in (1/15) increments. We
pose a similar treatment on the output gap coefficient, with a different response for each
ϕy = 0, 0.0667, 0.1333, 0.2, 0.2667, . . . , 4.9333, 5. This grid search is motivated by robust evidence in the empirical literature of structural change in the Federal Reserve’s systematic
response to economic fluctuations. Coibion et al. (2012) conduct a similar search over a
range of values for ϕπ but in the context of welfare gains. Additionally, the conventional
wisdom in the empirical literature is that the Federal Reserve has become more forwardlooking regarding inflation in modern times. Quantifying this degree of forward-lookingness
is a difficult proposition at best. We address this concern in an imperfect way by also letting
the horizon (hπ ) of inflation expectations—as well as output expectations (hy )—in the policy
feedback rule (4.14) take on values between zero and 12 months.

13

P
Based on the restriction scheme F̄ , we produce impulse responses to εM
shocks from
t

a total of 976,144 different structural VAR specifications (comprising a combination
of 76 possible values of ϕπ , with another 76 possible values for ϕy , 13 potential horizons
(hπ = 0, .., 12) for inflation expectations, the first expectation term in equation (4.16), and
another 13 (hy = 0, .., 12) for output in the second term.9 All of these (976K) permutations
of parameters render clouds of uniquely identified structural responses.10
We tally up the incidence of puzzling responses with the following arbitrary heuristic.
Following a contractionary shock to the federal funds rate (ordered first in our specifications), we count as a puzzle any industrial production or PCE inflation response that shows
a positive value at any time within the first year following the shock.
Any industrial production response at any, or all, horizons between impact and the
twelfth period post-shock, we designate an output puzzle. We keep a separate count for
the incidence of PCE inflation puzzles. There may often be realizations that show both of
these puzzling responses. Therefore, we also report the sets of surviving responses that show
neither puzzle. We call these the “no (joint) puzzles responses,” which exclude the incidence
of either or both puzzles according to our criterion described above. In addition, we register
the ϕπ and ϕy values of the surviving responses.

4.3

Clouds of F̄ -Rendered Impulse Responses

Figure 1 contains eight charts organized in two columns. Beginning with the left column,
the Northwest (top left) column chart contains the responses of the policy indicator variable to its own shock. The solid-dotted yellow line is the median response across the 976K
specifications, each of which is represented by a solid black line. This creates a cloud of
976K distinct responses. Some abnormally large responses dominate the scaling, creating
the incorrect impression that the median response is zero. The remaining charts in the left
column show clouds of puzzling responses (according to our heuristic above) for each of the
variables in the system. Similarly, all charts from the second row to the end of the right
9

AIC selected a lag of six for a VAR specification containing our variables based on a Cholesky ordering

for our sample. For comparability, we fix this lag length across our 976K specifications.
10
A few combinations of these hyperparameters yield outsized shapes of responses, which dominate the
scaling but in all cases constitute a minute proportion. Dominated by these infrequent large-scale responses,
there are often hundreds upon hundreds of responses (including the median responses of each set) that are
superimposed (or nearly so) on each other.
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column show clouds of, what we term, surviving responses—responses for each variable that
do not show a puzzle in either inflation and/or output.
Each solid black line in the chart located in the second row of the left column shows a
puzzling response (containing positive values at any time during the first year) of the PCE
inflation rate. This chart also produces the median response across this black cloud of puzzling responses denoted by the solid-dotted red line. The chart includes a count of these
puzzling responses expressed as a percent of the overall number of specifications—for this
specification, 50.9% of the 976,144 responses show a positive response of inflation at any
time during the first year to an exogenous increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, this
graph also includes a solid-dotted green line denoting the median response of the nonpuzzling
responses. For example, if the black cloud of these puzzling responses constituted 50.9% of
the 976K total responses, the solid-dotted red line shows the median response across these,
while the solid-dotted green line shows the median response of the remaining nonpuzzling
49.1% responses (not shown in this specific subchart).
The next subchart down the left column repeats the analysis for industrial production
with a cloud of responses, each of which showing at least one positive value in the first 12
months. The red dotted line is the median response across these, whereas the green dotted line shows the median response in the cloud of sensible (non-puzzling) output responses
(not shown in the subchart). The incidence of an output puzzle stands at a small 2.1%
of the total 976K responses. Some of these puzzle responses, however, could overlap with
an inflation puzzle showing a joint puzzle—specifications that show both an inflation and
an output puzzle. Every one of the output responses we report in the small cloud of output puzzles stems from a specification that also shows an inflation puzzle. Thus, we find
50.9% of responses show an inflation puzzle, 2.1% of responses show an output puzzle, and
the total percent of responses that show neither puzzle is 49.07% of the total 976K responses.
The subchart at the bottom of the left column shows a cloud of responses of the excess
bond premium that stem from a specification that yields an inflation puzzle, an output puzzle, or both. This is a cloud containing 50.9% of these joint puzzle responses.
We now describe the right column. Each blue line in the subchart located in the second
row shows an inflation response for a given specification that did not incur a puzzle in either
variable. The label on the y-axis counts the number of these blue lines in this cloud, which
corresponds to the responses that “survive” any puzzling behavior as we define it above—a
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total of 478,952 responses constituting 49.1% of the total combinations. The solid-dotted
green line shows the median of these sensible responses, which for our model, is roughly
comparable with the solid-dotted green line on the corresponding chart on the left column.
The next subchart down the column repeats the analysis for industrial production and the
bottom right column subchart shows a blue cloud of responses of the excess bond premium
that stem from a no (joint) puzzle specification. The bar chart at the top of the right column
takes the number of surviving responses and collates them according to the values of ϕπ and
ϕy . For example, if we have a 49.1% survival rate, then the bar chart would distribute the
resulting 478,952 sensible responses as follows. If the x-axis at zero for ϕy shows a light
colored bar at 1,700, this would mean that 1,700 out of the 478K sensible responses had a
value of zero for the output coefficient (in combination with possible values of 0 ≤ ϕπ ≤ 5
and hπ /hy = 0, ...12). Similarly, if the dark-colored bar at the six value of the x-axis for ϕπ
showed 478,952, there would be no other bars in the bar chart and it would mean all the sensible responses had a value of ϕπ = 5 (in combination with 0 ≤ ϕy ≤ 5 and hπ /hy = 0, ...12).
Figure 1 shows that the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate yields clouds of responses for
inflation, output, and EBP that can be roughly bisected into qualitatively puzzling (the
black cloud of responses on the left column) and qualitatively sensible responses (the blue
clouds on the right). We estimate a cloud of 478,952 sensible responses for each of these
variables drawn in blue along with a median response (across the 479K for each step of the
impulse response function) drawn as a green dotted-solid line. Focusing on these responses,
the highest incidence of responses shows a value of ϕy between 0.5 and 1, with the incidence
of values higher than 1 decreasing somewhat monotonically from 1 through 5. Whereas virtually no response shows a value of ϕπ less than 0.5, with the incidence of values increasing
monotonically from 0.5 through 5. Over 90% of the sensible responses show values of ϕπ
consistent with the Taylor Principle.
Overall, these results are highly stylized. They are conditioned on an economic structure—that is assumed a priori appropriate—in order to generate time series of structural
shocks that are, subsequently, fed through a range of values of the structural parameters in a
Taylor-type policy reaction function. Letting the data reveal the dynamics of the responses
of interest is a useful approach to obtaining not merely theoretic-consistent responses from
a mapping scheme, but responses that are derived directly from the theory. Another advantage of the approach is that it allows us to directly model, from the observables in the
system,11 the forward-lookingness of a monetary feedback rule—insofar as the Federal Re11

Our approach to modeling forward-looking expectations differs from the traditional DSGE approach,
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serve’s forward-lookingness be encapsulated in the horizons of output and inflation.
Ours is a different methodology to the standard approach, which typically begins with a
statistical VAR and subsequently imposes a restriction strategy for a plausible mapping between statistical innovations and structural shocks. The standard approach may be founded
on relatively weak or rather uncontroversial restrictions. But they can also be prescriptively
governed by overly restrictive mapping schemes. Implictly, our restriction strategy for generating clouds of responses from a theoretical solution set ÂT stems from within the system.
Beginning from this RE-SVAR specification, we now turn to overlaying further restrictions
from within our VAR system. But this time we restrict the realizations of the structural
shocks themselves, rather than the laws of motion of the system. We will then append further restrictions from information external to the VAR.

5

Overlaying Restrictions

In deference to the notion that monetary policy may have experienced substantial regime
changes throughout the period we investigate, we consider three separate classes of empirical
restrictions. First, we examine the incidence of large shocks throughout our sample, which
can be characterized as shock size constraints, and we denote these as Ḡ1 (A). We, then,
focus on a portion of our sample, a period when UMP was prevalent. This second type of
restriction involves event constraints where some ex post knowledge of a particular period
may be suggestive of some feature of the structural shock of interest. Specifically, we focus
on the Quantitative Easing (QE) and Quantitative Tightening (QT) events that took place
in the aftermath of the GFC and beyond. We will denote these restrictions as Ḡ2 (A) and
Ḡ3 (A). Finally, we consider external variables to the VAR and impose a priori assumption
for how they should correlate to the VAR variables. These external variable constraints are
denoted by Ḡ4 (A).

5.1

Size Restrictions

We now inspect the structural shocks that our purely theoretical restriction strategy F̄
yields and look for periods when those shocks had realized large values. The idea is that if
which requires the addition of unobservables though a state equation onto a comparatively more restrictive
search of the parameter space.
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an identified shock is large, particularly around a period known to be fraught with instability associated with the shock of interest, one may more reasonably assume the shock has a
material effect not spuriously introduced by a questionable identification strategy. This idea
is introduced by Antolı́n-Dı́az and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2018) and refined by Ludvigson et al.
(2021).
Figure 2 registers the distribution of maximum values for each realization of the four
structural shocks of the RE-SVAR. At first glance, none of these shocks exhibit Gaussianity
P
in their distribution of maximum values. The distributions of εM
and εIS
exhibit some
t
t

skewness. Interestingly, a majority of the maximum values of the first three shocks occur in
Sep-Oct of 2008 (94% of the maximum values of the first shock, 96% of the second shock,
and 54% of the third shock are found on these dates). This is a period typically associated
with high uncertainty surrounding the GFC when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and
when the DJIA index fell roughly 20%. At 33%, the highest incidence of values for the shock
to the excess bond premium is found in July 2013, which is roughly around a reactionary
panic (commonly known as the Taper Tantrum) that triggered a spike in U.S. Treasury
yields following a Federal Reserve announcement that it would slowly begin unwinding the
QE program.
Motivated by these findings from the RE-SVAR structural shocks, we consider the following Ḡ1 (A) restriction set:
2
3
4
Ḡ1 (A) : εAS
∧ εIS
∧ εBR
{2008:10} ≥ τ
{2008:10} ≥ τ
{2013:7} ≥ τ

(5.22)

where τ 2 = 0.313, τ 3 = 0.805, and τ 4 = 0.110 which constitute the 75th percentile values
of each respective shock on the corresponding date. As mentioned earlier, by construction
these restrictions may not in any way add to the cloud of responses generated by F̄ . The
Ḡ1 (A) restriction scheme may be informative if it helps in thinning out the cloud generated
by F̄ and uninformative if it does not narrow down the set of responses. Every realization
of the four shocks is obtained from a given combination of the hyperparameters outlined
in the previous sections. Therefore, if a given realization of, say, εAS
does not satisfy the
t
restriction in Ḡ1 (A), not only does that particular realization of εAS
exit the solution set
t
P
BR
AT but, importantly, the accompanying εM
, εIS
for that same realization of the
t
t , and εt

structural parameters are removed as well.12
12

P
We could have also imposed the restriction scheme Ḡ1 (A) on the first shock in the system εM
directly.
t

However, to remain conservative given our interest in the dynamic responses to structural disturbances in
the first variable, we opt not to impose the restriction on the first shock.
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5.2

Event Restrictions: QE and QT

There is demonstrative work that, following 2008, the tools of monetary policy changed. See
work by Gagnon et al. (2011); Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011); D’Amico et al.
(2012); Wright (2012); D’Amico and King (2013); Carpenter et al. (2015); Ihrig et al. (2018);
Swanson (2018); Swanson (2020); Bundick and Smith (2020); Vayanos and Vila (2021) and
Christensen and Gillan (2022). This could have led to changes in transmission mechanisms of
monetary policy. Our RE-SVAR is founded on a specification substantiated by a consensus
model of the macroeconomy with a P C curve, an IS curve, and a monetary policy rule.
However, it could be argued that the relevance of the consensus model might have changed
after GFC—hence the need for augmentation with added restrictions. Importantly, while
there is ample evidence that the excess bond premium is useful and important in empirical work, there is a dearth of theoretical work on how to incorporate it into the consensus
macroeconomic model (before and after GFC). This is highlighted by our choice to place
the EBP in fourth place in our RE-SVAR, along with a milder restriction in equation (4.10)
relative to that of equation (4.7). Therefore, we now turn to restriction schemes that mostly
bind to the shock to the fourth variable (εBR
t ) surrounding well-known events during the
(post-2008) UMP period. We impose two restriction sets: Ḡ2 (A) dealing with the Taper
Tantrum, and Ḡ3 (A) dealing with QE episodes.
Following nearly half-a-decade-long accommodation in response to the GFC, the Federal
Reserve began a gradual normalization effort. Table 1 shows two announcements by, then,
Chairperson Bernanke, on the Fed’s intent to eventually taper the pace of purchases, which
led to a financial market reaction known as the Taper Tantrum. Later on, Table 1 shows
that a plan for a gradual normalization is hinted at in May 2014 and begins in earnest in
September 2014. This became known as the QT period, which extended from September
2014 to about August of 2019. There were two distinct subperiods of QT. From September
2014 through September 2017, the Federal Reserve reinvested proceeds of maturing securities. This Full Reinvestment phase resulted in declining reserves without a commensurate
decline in asset holdings. Then, beginning in September 2017 until August 2019, the Federal
Reserve purchased fewer assets than were maturing. This Asset Runoff phase resulted in
declines in both reserves and the Fed’s asset holdings.
Smith and Valcarcel (2020) outline a strong asymmetric effect of both phases of QT
on financial interest rates relative to the earlier QE periods that took place prior to 2014.
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Especially after the Taper Tantrum episode the FOMC engaged in a concerted effort to
divorce expectations of future rate increases from unwinding the balance sheet. Therefore,
while QE announcements typically contained a large signaling component, signaling effects
were mostly absent from QT announcements. Consequentially, those authors show a significant response of various financial rates (treasury yields, corporate bond rates, MBSs,
and Eurodollar) within a two-day window of the Taper Tantrum announcement, whereas
QT announcements elicited no significant financial market response. Motivated by these
conclusions, we consider the following Ḡ2 (A) restriction scheme:
BR
Ḡ2 (A) : std(εBR
{2013:05−2013:07} ) ≥ 2 × std(ε{2014:05−2014:07} )

∧ ...

BR
∧ std(εBR
{2013:05−2013:07} ) ≥ 2 × std(ε{2017:09−2017:11} )

(5.23)

around the June 2013 anThis restriction requires variation in the structural shock εBR
t
nouncement related to the Taper Tantrum to be much larger than the variance around the
first phase of the QT period in June 2014 and during QT’s Asset Runoff phase in October
2017.
More broadly, the finding in Smith and Valcarcel (2020) that QT announcement effects
on financial markets were negligible facilitates a comparison to a relatively large literature
(see e.g. Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Bauer and
Rudebusch (2014) among others) that finds important financial effects from QE announcements. However, the various QE episodes may have had materially different effects on interest
rates of various financial markets. In a detailed review of the QE literature, Kuttner (2018)
highlights an overall agreement that QE1 announcements had very large, negative effects
on interest rates, whereas the effects of subsequent QE programs on yields were materially
smaller. Thus, we consider the following Ḡ3 (A) restriction scheme:
BR
Ḡ3 (A) : std(εBR
{2008:11−2009:01} ) ≥ 3 × std(ε{2010:08−2010:11} )

∧ ...

BR
∧ std(εBR
{2008:11−2009:01} ) ≥ 3 × std(ε{2012:09−2012:11} )

(5.24)

This restriction requires variation in the structural shock εBR
around the QE1 announcet
ment to be much larger than the variance around the QE2 and QE3 periods.
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5.3

External Variable Restrictions During the UMP Period

Substantial research on structural identification has often incorporated information that is
external to the SVAR. Some of the information may stem from observable variables that augment the VAR with: a very large panel of real and financial factors for the US as in Bernanke
et al. (2005), a panel of international factors as in Mumtaz and Surico (2009), or a small
set of money market factors for the US as in Chen and Valcarcel (2021). Other approaches
have used a narrative approach from unobservables. This has often involved constructing
shock series from historical readings of political and economic events to be used as external
instrumental variables as in Baker and Bloom (2013), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013),
Mertens and Ravn (2014), among others.
Much of this external variable instrument literature achieves point identification by assuming that the instruments have a zero correlation with some shocks (the traditional orthogonality assumption required for identification) and a nonzero correlation with others (an
assumption on the informational content of the instrument that is relevant to the question at
hand). Importantly, our overlaying restrictions Ḡ1 (A)—Ḡ4 (A) may provide finer sifting of
the clouds of structural responses (set identification) but do not necessarily guarantee point
identification. Thus, we follow the reasoning by Ludvigson et al. (2021) in stipulating that
our choice of external variables is not required to be valid exogenous instruments that have
zero correlations with some of our identified shocks. Instead, we only require the milder
condition that the random processes driving our chosen external variables be determined
outside of the VAR system, while allowing the variables themselves to be partially correlated with some of the variables in the system. This facilitates further winnowing of our sets
of structural responses.
We consider three variables external to our system: the log of bank reserves (Rt ), the
spread between the 10-year and 1-year treasury rates (T Rt ), and the 1-month federal funds
futures rate (f ft ). Data on federal funds futures has been prominent as a plausible instrument
of policy shocks since the seminal work of Friedman and Kuttner (1992), Kuttner (2001) and,
more recently, Gertler and Karadi (2015). The 10-to-1 year treasury interest rate spread is a
popular measure of the term structure theory of interest rates and its relation to monetary
policy shocks. Finally, a strong relationship between reserves balances and monetary policy
has been established by: (i) Strongin (1995) during the Great inflation period, (ii) Carpenter
et al. (2012) in the aftermath of the GFC, and (iii) Smith and Valcarcel (2020) during the
first QT period of the late 2010s. We impose the following restriction
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P
P
, Rt ){2013:06−2017:10}
, Rt ){2017:10−2019:09} ≤ corr(εM
Ḡ4 (A) : corr(εM
t
t

∧ ...

BR
∧ corr(εBR
t , Rt ){2017:10−2019:09} ≤ corr(εt , Rt ){2013:06−2017:10}

∧ ...

∧ corr(εBR
t , f ft ){2008:04−2008:12} ≤ 0

∧ ...

(5.25)

∧ corr(εBR
t , T Rt ){2008:04−2008:12} ≥ 0
where the first two inequalities relate to the QT period and the latter two bind to the
GFC. The first inequality restricts the correlation between log reserves and monetary policy
shocks to be more deeply negative during the Asset runoff phase of the QT period than
during the previous phase of QT—which occurred between 2013:06, the month of the taper
tantrum, and 2017:10 the month when the Fed begins the active phase of its balance sheet
unwind. This choice is motivated by the finding in Smith and Valcarcel (2020) of a stronger
liquidity effect at work during the second phase of the QT period than during the previous
Full Reinvestment period (see Figure 3).13 The second inequality restricts the correlation
between log reserves and the BR shock to follow the same pattern as that of the M P shock.
Again Smith and Valcarcel (2020) find overwhelming evidence of a tightening of financial
conditions taking place across many financial markets during the asset runoff stage of QT
with little indication of this dynamic occurring during the Full Reinvestment phase of QT.
The third inequality in (5.25) imposes a negative correlation between the BR shocks
and the federal funds rate futures in the months between JP Morgan Chase purchase of the
failing Bear Stearns and the Fed’s onset of the ELB period. This is a period of financial
turmoil when the EBP experienced substantial hikes even as markets were pricing a high
probability that the Fed would conduct a massive expansionary policy. Finally, the fourth
inequality restriction imposes a positive correlation between the term premium and the BR
shock over this key period, when investors were likely flocking to the safety of treasuries as
most financial condition indicators (including the EBP measure) were spiking.
13

More recently, Sengupta et al. (2022) predict a more aggressive post-COVID-19 QT period, than the

pre-COVID-19 period Smith and Valcarcel (2020) study, may have more portentous effects on financial
conditions.
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6

Evidence from an Empirically Augmented RE-SVAR
Identification

Figures 4 – 6 show responses from our RE theoretically motivated scheme F̄ , placed on
the northwest corner of each figure. Essentially these are the 976,144 responses that were
already discussed in Figure 1. The rest of the charts in each figure correspond to: (i) the
restriction on the size of structural shocks (Ḡ1 (A)), (ii) the event restrictions surrounding
the QT period (Ḡ2 (A)), (iii) the event restrictions surrounding the QE period (Ḡ3 (A)), and
(iv) external variable restrictions described by (Ḡ4 (A)). The operative shock throughout
these results is a contractionary exogenous standard deviation increase in the federal funds
rate (augmented with the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate during the ELB period).
The grey areas in those figures are formed from all the applicable impulse response function estimates that conform to each identification strategy. The left chart on the top row of
each figure shows the responses from all the 976K combinations of parameters in the RESVAR—the F̄ restriction scheme. The remaining charts in each figure show the responses
from overlaying each of the Ḡ1 (A) – Ḡ4 (A) restriction strategies on to F̄ . Thus, each Ḡ(A)
scheme will either present the same number of responses—if completely uninformative—or
a reduced number of responses from the 976K in F̄ . If the overlaying restrictions effectively
provide a winnowing effect, the resulting figures will be delimited by a smaller region of
responses.
Figure 4 shows inflation responses to a contractionary shock in the federal funds rate for
the RE-SVAR F̄ model and the four overlaying restrictions. The left chart on the top row
of the figure shows the 976K responses congruent with the F̄ scheme. The chart shows a
relatively small (grey) region of responses that lay above zero within the first 12 months post
shock. A much larger region shows a sensibly negative response of inflation to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the first year. The black and blue lines show a reduction in
inflation following a monetary contraction and a return to zero about one-and-a-half years
after the shock. This chart also reports the median values across all responses for the Taylor
Rule coefficients and the median horizon in the expectation for each. The median values for
ϕπ and ϕy are 2.5 and 4.3, respectively, with the median horizons for both at 6 months. Our
RE-SVAR specification is highly indicative of an active and forward-looking Fed, strongly
following the Taylor Principle in its response to inflation.
The middle chart of the top row shows the inflation responses that—starting from RE23

SVAR described by the F̄ scheme—overlay the Ḡ1 (A) restriction strategy based on the size
of the shocks described earlier. This restriction winnows the 976K responses from F̄ down
to 710,731 responses that satisfy the shock size restrictions. The responses from the Ḡ1 (A)
scheme show an even smaller region of puzzling responses in the first 6 months. The Taylor
Rule coefficients for the median response across the 710K responses are still large and consistent with the Taylor Principle, with the horizon for inflation still at 6 months, but now
the horizon for output is 10 months ahead. The mean, median and mode responses all show
qualitatively sensible dynamics.
The top right chart shows the inflation responses for the Ḡ2 (A) restriction schemes surrounding the QT events outlined earlier. At 23,540 responses that satisfy this overlying
restriction strategy, Ḡ2 (A) proves restrictive and informative as it serves to winnow out a
very large number off of the original 976K responses. The region of inflation puzzles that stem
from this scheme is virtually nil. The mean, median and mode responses show expected and
sensible dynamics. The median values for ϕπ and ϕy are 3.3 and 1.0, respectively, with the
median horizons for inflation settling at two-months-ahead, and the median horizon for output at 11. In many respects, the QT restriction scheme in Ḡ2 (A) might be the most sensible.
The bottom left chart shows the inflation responses for the Ḡ3 (A) restriction schemes
surrounding the QE events outlined earlier. This restriction scheme vastly reduces the region
of permissible responses from 976K to 81,117. However, the median and mode responses do
show a puzzling response where inflation increases for the first four months following the
contractionary shock. In addition, at 0.8, the median value for ϕπ is too low for consistency
with the Taylor Principle. Finally, the bottom right chart for the Ḡ4 (A) restriction schemes
based on information from the external variables, provides the largest reduction in responses
from 976K down to merely 18,924. This scheme yields a negligible region of puzzling responses within the first year as well as sensible responses for the mean and median across
the set. However, this scheme suggests no forward-lookingness in the rule for output stabilization (hy = 0), and ϕπ at a low value of 0.73.
Figure 5 shows the responses of industrial production (as our output measure) to contractionary policy shocks. The 976K RE-SVAR (F̄ ) responses on the left of the top row show
a smaller region of industrial production lying above than below zero. All mean, median,
and mode responses display the correct sign in response to a contractionary monetary policy
shock. The middle chart on the top row shows the Ḡ1 (A) size restriction set. There is substantial winnowing down to 71K responses, which successfully eliminate all those responses
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that laid above zero in the RE-SVAR responses of the previous chart. The next chart for
the QT scheme Ḡ2 (A) reduces the region substantially, down to 23,540. And the mean and
median responses look sound. However, the restriction seems to mostly thin out the sensible
negative region from F̄ so that zero now bisects the set of responses roughly equally. The
bottom left chart for the QE-motivated Ḡ3 (A) restrictions shows the vast majority of the
81,117 responses to be sensible. Finally, the bottom right chart for the Ḡ3 (A) restrictions
based on external variables show mostly sensible, but with a nonnegligible positive portion
of responses.
Figure 6 shows the excess bond premium responses to exogenous standard deviation
increases in the federal funds rate for the RE-SVAR (at the top left) and the overlaying restrictions Ḡ1 (A) – Ḡ4 (A). Here, there seems to be overwhelming qualitative agreement on
the positive EBP response across restriction strategies. Perhaps the worst performing chart
is that of the QT-motivated Ḡ2 (A) restriction scheme where the region of responses within
the first year is more or less evenly divided across zero, which suggests Ḡ2 (A) is relatively
uninformative for the EBP response to a federal funds rate hike within the first year.
Our RE-SVAR F̄ scheme elicits informative responses for all the variables in the system—insofar as the ensuing ranges of responses tend to fall either mostly north, or mostly
south, of zero. The Ḡ1 (A) scheme based on the size of the AS, IS, and BR shocks proves
to be the least restrictive in that it reduces the number of responses produced by F̄ down
by 27%. Still, this restriction scheme exhibits desirable properties in terms of the qualitative
nature of the responses, the degree of forward-lookingness, and the adherence to the Taylor
Principle in the (4.7) policy rule.
The remaining overlaying restrictions Ḡ2 (A), Ḡ3 (A), and Ḡ4 (A) look to be far more
restrictive as the cloud of responses satisfying these restrictions reduce the original cloud by
an order of magnitude. The Ḡ2 (A) scheme bearing on the BR shocks on dates surrounding
the QT event reduces the number of responses from 976,144 down to 23,540. The ensuing
response for inflation looks sensible regarding shape, coefficient and horizon values. The output (i.e. industrial production) response is, however fairly uninformative. While the mean
and median responses across the 25K responses look textbook, there are many responses that
predict a positive output reaction to a monetary contraction. Indeed the zero line seems to
mostly bisect the set of responses, rendering them somewhat ambiguous. Ḡ3 (A), which operates on the BR shock surrounding events during the QE period shows some mixed results
from the resultant 81,117 responses. For the most part, the regions of inflation and output
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responses appropriately lie below zero. However, the mean and median inflation responses
lie above zero for the first four months and the median value for ϕπ = 0.8 that is too low to
satisfy the Taylor Principle. Finally, the external variable Ḡ4 (A) strategy provides the most
restrictive scheme with the smallest number of responses at 18,924. The dynamic responses
look sensible but ϕπ = 0.73 is again too low.
Overall, most of the inflation and output responses to a monetary contraction are found
to lie within a sensible range. And, by and large, the EBP responses are qualitatively robust
across restriction strategies. This concludes the treatment that stems from the theoretical
solution scheme AT , which consisted of overlaying empirical restrictions (Ḡ1 (A) – Ḡ4 (A))
onto a purely theoretical (F̄ ) methodology from the RE-SVAR. We next turn to the purely
empirical solution approach AE , where we begin with an empirical scheme Ḡ0 (A) and overlay the same Ḡ1 (A) – Ḡ4 (A) restrictions.

7

A Purely Empirical ÂE Restriction Strategy

For many macroeconomic applications, requisite restrictions for n(n − 1)/2 elements of A
that guarantee the unique mapping in equation (2) may still be debatable, contentious, or
otherwise simply unavailable. One way of circumventing the uniqueness issue and having to
defend a theoretically-motivated restriction is advanced by Ludvigson et al. (2021). Theirs
is an innovative approach that persuasively turns the identification paradigm on its head by
generating large sets of candidate solutions for A that satisfy ÂE .
There are trade-offs to the approach. A major advantage is that this method generates
orthogonal shocks without having to defend any particular mapping (2), which is itself unobservable. Another advantage is that by beginning with a desirably weak restriction scheme (a
large set of candidate solutions), their approach provides added flexibility to overlay further
restriction schemes (as we do in our theoretical model) premised on empirical characteristics
of the generated shocks—based on information inside and outside of the VAR system. A
disadvantage of their framework is that it does not allow for point identification of the restriction scheme—a point emphasized in the paper. Since no mapping is uniquely identified,
the technique does not produce point estimates of impulse response functions. That is, the
mapping advanced is set-identified (rather than point-identified) rendering response regions
that would contain uncountably many, and equally likely, potential combinations of line responses. Importantly, while the shocks generated from the solution set of A are orthogonal,
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they may or may not have an economic interpretation.
The approach to solving for ÂE begins by initializing the A matrix with a lower-triangular
Cholesky factor of Ω̂e with non-negative diagonal elements P̂ . Then, a matrix of n x n
random variables M ∼ N (0, 1) is drawn from which an ensuing orthonormal Q matrix from
the QR decomposition of M such that A = P̂ Q. This procedure is then repeated an
arbitrarily large number of times (r) to collect a set of possible solutions:
ÂE = {A = P̂ Q : Q ∈ On , diag(A) ≥ 0, vech(Ω̂e ) − vech(AA′ ) = 0}

(7.26)

where On is a set of n x n orthonormal matrices. Given the mapping in (2), r-many
generated values for A ∈ AE —constructed from r-many rotations of the matrix Q—yield
r-many unconstrained values of εrt (A) = (P̂ Q)−1 eˆt (B̂) for t = 1, 2, ...T . As Ludvigson
et al. (2021) point out, the set of (r) possible solutions of ÂE do not allow for point identification of A toward a unique identification of structural shocks εt (A). Instead, a set of
r-many shocks εrt (A) equally likely over the sample t = 1, 2, ..., T can be generated. Subsequently, further restrictions can be overlayed to reduce the set of plausible εrt (A) responses.14
Thus, the first set of possible solutions to the mapping matrix AE conforms to a very
mild restriction of (7.26) consistent with the nonnegativity of the covariance matrix of the
VAR. This is the starting point from where the region of possible responses cannot increase.15
Subsequently, we consider further restrictions to potentially narrow down the potential sets
of responses.
Following the QR factorization described in equation (7.26) we generate a total of r=1
million rotations of the Q matrix, which allows us to construct a set of one million shocks
εrt (A) equally likely over the sample t = 1, 2, ..., T for each of the four variables. Importantly,
these shocks are not motivated by any theoretical assumption, no matter how innocuous.
Instead, the ensuing shocks stem from the weak restriction ḠZ (A) corresponding to equation 3. As mentioned earlier, this covariance restriction is enough to generate large sets of
empirical AE solutions but not enough for structural identification. We refer to this starting
point when the identification scheme (Z = 0) is mildest as Ḡ0 (A)—which is the analog
empirically restricted starting point to our theoretically restricted F̄ from the RE-SVAR.
14

See Ludvigson et al. (2021) and Antolı́n-Dı́az and Rubio-Ramı́rez (2018) for restrictions schemes based

on the size of shocks during certain historical events.
15
See Ludvigson et al. (2021) for details on this feature.
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Therefore, we begin our search of possible restrictions ḠZ (A) of the parameter space
with the nonnegative covariance matrix restriction imposed in (7.26). Ḡ0 (A) should provide
the widest and most uninformative regions of responses over the one million rotations. We
then overlay other restriction schemes one at a time so that each must always satisfy the
Ḡ0 (A) covariance condition and the added size/event/external restrictions and, hopefully,
further constrain the set of plausible responses.
Importantly, we overlay the same restriction strategies Ḡ1 (A), Ḡ2 (A), Ḡ3 (A), and
Ḡ4 (A) onto our Ḡ0 (A) for the pure empirical solution set AE as we placed earlier (onto
F̄ ) for the purely theoretical solution set AT . We then bootstrap the rotated sets of shocks
for each variable and generate the regions of responses that satisfy each restriction scheme.
While the following figures are reminiscent of the cloud of responses reported earlier from the
RE-SVAR, they are substantially different in that they are not clouds of uniquely identified
lines (point estimate identification). Instead, they represent regions of responses where point
identification is not feasible. Each region represents a continuum of equally likely values for
a given response.

8

The Full Empirical Scheme Ḡ0(A) – Ḡ4(A)

Figure 7 shows the regions of least-restrictive Ḡ0 (A) responses to a contractionary shock in
the federal funds rate. We append to each chart the corresponding response to a Cholesky
factorization on the xt = [it , πt , yt , bt , ]′ and display it as a red line. With the exception of
the federal funds rate response to its own shock, the rest of responses look largely uninformative. This is highlighted by the fact that zero bisects the sets of responses for each of the
three variables. The inflation response looks to be the most symmetrically divided above
and below the zero line for the first 24 months post shock. It is only at longer horizons
that a larger portion of the response falls in the negative territory. There are even odds
that industrial production responds either positively or negatively to a contractionary policy
shock during the first year. From the second year on, however, the response looks statistically positive. The EBP response looks uninformative as well, particularly for the first 16
months after the contractionary shock. These Ḡ0 (A) responses starkly contrast those of the
F̄ RE-SVAR in Figures 4 – 6. The inflation response is largely negative within 12 months
from the incidence of the shock in F̄ and by and large uninformative in Ḡ0 (A). A large
majority of industrial production responses are sensibly negative in F̄ and uninformative for
Ḡ0 (A)—and the Cholesky response shows a puzzingly positive output response in the first
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four months following the contractionary shock. After 20 months post shock, Ḡ0 (A) and
F̄ show the most agreement for a positive EBP response. However, at short horizons, the
RE-SVAR predicts a largely positive EBP response, whereas the EBP response in Ḡ0 (A)
remains ambiguous.
In a similar analysis to what we conducted earlier, we now inspect the one million shocks
from the purely empirical restriction strategy Ḡ0 (A) and look for periods when those shocks
had realized large values. Figure 8 shows the distribution of maximum values for each realization of the four shocks. At first glance, none of these shocks exhibit Gaussianity in their
distribution of maximum values. The distributions of the first three shocks do exhibit a relatively lower degree of skewness than those of the RE-SVAR in Figure 2. Perhaps a function
of the relative lack of informative responses from Ḡ0 (A), maximum values are found to be
much more diffused throughout the rotations, suggested by the lower percentages in Ḡ0 (A)
relative to F̄ for each shock. The empirical Ḡ0 (A) restriction finds 28% of the one million
rotations of the first shock are found to have a maximum value in October 1989—whereas F̄
finds 94% of the 976K plausible combinations of the first shock are found in September 2008.
There is more agreement about the maximum value of the inflation shock. Both find the
maximum value of the second shock in October 2008 (31% for the one million in Ḡ0 (A) and
96% for the 976K in F̄ ). Coincidentally both schemes find 54% of the generated shocks to
industrial production variable find a maximum value (again in October 1989 for Ḡ0 (A) and
in October 2008 for F̄ ). Finally, at 37% of the one million rotations of Ḡ0 (A), the maximum
value of the EBP shock is found in October 2008, and at 33% of the 976K in F̄ , the highest
incidence of values for this fourth shock is found in July 2013. Overall, the highest incidences
of maximum values for shocks in the federal funds rate, as well as industrial production, are
found in October 1989 and the highest values for inflation and the EBP are found in October
2008.
We now overlay the first set of restrictions Ḡ1 (A) using the exact same heuristics we
employed in our RE-SVAR, but now based on the profile for the size of the shocks from
Figure 8. Furthermore, we consider the same restrictions—Ḡ2 (A) and Ḡ3 (A)—based on
the same events from the QT and QE periods, respectively, that we appended previously
onto our RE-SVAR. Finally, we impose the same external variable restrictions Ḡ4 (A) as
well. We chiefly overlay these same Ḡ1 (A) – Ḡ4 (A) restrictions in the same fashion (one at
a time) as we previously did for the RE-SVAR.16
16

For example, we do not comprehensively mount the restriction schemes onto each other. The Ḡ1 (A)

notation for the RE-SVAR, involves overlaying a size restriction onto F̄ and, alternatively, Ḡ2 (A) involves
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Column (a) of Figure 9 shows the response regions from overlaying the size shock constraint Ḡ1 (A) onto the nonnegative covariance restriction Ḡ0 (A). This restriction seems
effective in winnowing the region or responses from the one million original rotations in
Ḡ0 (A) down to 200,101 rotations which survive the Ḡ1 (A) constraint. However, the ensuing regions remain largely inconclusive, where an exogenous increase in the federal funds rate
seems to exert a roughly even region of responses falling in the positive and the negative territory of inflation, industrial production, and the EBP. Column (b) of Figure 9 shows results
from imposing the events surrounding the QT period Ḡ2 (A). There are 65,285 rotations
(from the original one million) that satisfy these restriction schemes. The performance of the
inflation response worsens. While zero still bisects the region, we now see a larger portion
of the set falling in the positive territory consistent with an inflation puzzle. This stands in
sharp contrast to the inflation response from the RE-SVAR with the same Ḡ2 (A) restriction.
Conversely, the Ḡ2 (A) industrial production response marginally improves, from that of column (a), as it shows a slightly larger region falling below zero. Finally, the EBP response
here looks more informative as well, now that a larger portion looks negative. However,
this contradicts the RE-SVAR evidence across all specifications, along with the Cholesky
prediction that EBP likely increases following a contractionary policy shock.
Figure 10 repeats the analysis for the QE restriction scheme—for Ḡ3 (A) displayed on the
left column—and for the restriction that brings external variable information from reserves,
treasury spreads, and data on federal funds futures—collected into Ḡ4 (A) on the right column of the figure. The QE-motivated Ḡ3 (A) restrictions winnow down the regions from the
original one million to 215,543 rotations. However, the shapes of the regions remain largely
inconclusive for inflation, industrial production, and the EBP. The contrast in the performance is salient for the external variable restrictions strategy. First, Ḡ4 (A) whittles down
the permissible number of rotations by more than one order of magnitude. Out of the original one million rotations, only 77,407 rotations satisfy these restrictions. More important,
the shape of the inflation and industrial production responses are now more informative.
Perhaps the largest improvement is for the inflation response. This restriction scheme seems
to perfectly resolve any incidence of the inflation puzzle, at least for the first six months
following the shock. While a portion of the response set turns positive between six and 40
appending a QT event restriction—instead of the size restriction—onto F̄ . We hold this for our purely
empirical strategy as well, where, say, Ḡ4 (A) overlays the external variable restriction alone onto Ḡ0 (A).
An alternative approach would be to cumulate the restrictions so that Ḡ4 (A) would impose size plus event
plus external variable restrictions onto F̄ , or Ḡ0 (A). This would of course be a far more restrictive approach.
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months post shock, this remains a relatively small region vastly dominated by the negative
response.
It is worth comparing this chart to the inflation response of the RE-SVAR for the same
Ḡ4 (A) restriction (the bottom right chart in Figure 4). The RE-SVAR shows a very small
positive region of inflation responses within the first four months, whereas the purely empirical response here guarantees no positive response in that time frame. Both specifications
show a relatively small region of positive responses at longer horizons. Finally, a point of
sharp contrast between the two approaches is that the negative region of the purely empirical
response proves to persist at longer horizons with a region that remains starkly negative even
at two years post shock. The negative region shrinks four years post shock. We would need
to extend the horizons of our impulse response functions to elucidate whether this negative
response eventually dies down. Conversely, the negative cloud of inflation responses from
the RE-SVAR returns to zero much quicker with virtually no negative inflation responses
remaining past 18 months. Further inspection of the (b) column of Figure 10 reveals the
industrial production response mostly lies below zero for the first 18 months post shock.
This looks to be the best performing industrial production response in the entire empirical
Ḡ0 (A)—Ḡ4 (A) identification schemes. Finally, the EBP response from the external variable
restriction scheme continues to be largely ambiguous.

9

Conclusion

We provide a framework for the identification of structural shocks that is grounded on a
purely theoretical foundation consistent with a rational expectations mechanism. An advantage of the approach is that it enables the modeling of forward-lookingness strictly from
observables within a reasonably small-scale system. Modeling forward-looking behavior has
typically been accomplished primarily through larger dimensional models buttressed with
information from unobservables. These theoretical methodologies have typically been the
province of DSGE modeling. And there has been a relatively large literature on what conditions are requisite for representing a medium/large scale forward-looking DSGE as an SVAR,
which is mostly a backward-looking modeling mechanism. Our RE-SVAR offers a compromise between the highly prescriptive large-dimensional approach of most DSGEs and the
loosely restricted search of the parameter space by most SVAR modeling—which are often
motivated, but not directly generated, by theory.
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We find our RE-SVAR provides a preponderance of sensible responses for inflation, industrial production, and EBP to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Of course, our
framework is directly and strictly constructed from a theoretical model. Therefore, we also
consider a purely empirical approach, which does not allow for point identification but rather
set identification of responses. We find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that an extremely weak restriction of the parameter space provides largely uninformative regions of responses. The
purely empirical approach is contingent on quite general and mild conditions for the generation of a shock from the data. The purely theoretical is far more restrictive but it does
allow for the construction of impulse response functions based on point estimate, rather than
regions. Consequently, we consider a middle ground by overlaying added empirical restrictions—both to the purely theoretical RE-SVAR strategy and the purely empirical one. We
find that our shock size restrictions help further refine conclusions of the RE-SVAR but are
largely uninformative for the empirical restriction scheme. Similarly, our event restrictions
surrounding QT and QE periods seem useful for our RE-SVAR but less so for the purely
empirical restriction scheme. Finally, restrictions from external data on reserves, treasury
spreads, and federal funds futures improves the performance of the purely empirical restriction scheme. Still, the RE-SVAR response, when combined with these external variable
restrictions, dominates that of the purely empirical strategy for the totality of the variables
in the system. Overall, we find our RE-SVAR restriction scheme performs rather well and
yields a relatively low incidence of output and inflation puzzles—particularly when augmenting it with other empirical restrictions. These same restriction schemes perform less well on
a purely empirical approach.
Both the conduct and the transmission of monetary policy have likely experienced important regime changes over time. The advent of the UMP period makes this observation even
more salient. This may lead to the conclusion that a Taylor rule-based consensus model may
be less applicable in the decade and a half since the GFC. Our paper shows results largely
at odds with that notion. We conclude that disciplining a VAR with a direct theoretical
scaffolding based on plausible parameterizations of the Taylor Rule may prove desirable.
Particularly, if it is properly augmented with information from markets whose relevance increased during the UMP period, such as the reserves or various money markets.
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Table 1: Quantitative Tightening Announcements

Date

Announcement

Description

Taper

Bernanke says tapering could begin “in the next few meetings”

Jun 19, 2013[b]

Taper

Bernanke states that tapering could be appropriate “later this year”

May 21, 2014[c]

Unwind

Minutes signal beginning of balance sheet normalization planning

Jul 9, 2014[c]

Unwind

Minutes discuss gradual approach to ceasing asset reinvestments

Aug 20, 2014[c]

Unwind

Minutes offer details on balance sheet normalization planning

Sep 17, 2014[c]

Unwind

FOMC releases Policy Normalization Principles and Plan

Jan 12, 2017[d]

Unwind

Three Fed speeches discuss normalizing the balance sheet

Apr 5, 2017[c]

Unwind

Minutes signal phasing out reinvestments “later this year”

May 24, 2017[c]

Unwind

Minutes detail plan for phasing out reinvestment

Jun 14, 2017[b]

Unwind

FOMC releases asset runoff plan, announces that runoff will

May 22, 2013

[a]

begin “this year”
Sep. 20, 2017[b]

Unwind

FOMC announces that asset runoff will begin next month

[a] Source: The Economic Outlook Congressional Hearings, 113th Congress, Joint Economic Committee.
[b] Source: FOMC Meeting Meeting calendars, statements, and minutes (2016-2021).
[c] Source: Federal Reserve History of the FOMC’s Policy Normalization Discussions and Communications.
[d] Source: Ben Bernanke’s Brookings Blog Shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet.
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Table 2: Quantitative Easing Announcements

Date
Nov 25, 2008

Announcement Event
[a]

Source

QE 1

FOMC Meeting Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Dec 1, 2008[a]

QE 1

Speech

Dec 16, 2008[a]

QE 1

FOMC Meeting Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Jan 28, 2009[a]

QE 1

FOMC Meeting Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Mar 18, 2009[a]

QE 1

FOMC Meeting Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Aug 10, 2010[a]

QE 2

FOMC Meeting Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Sep 21, 2010[a]

QE 2

FOMC Meeting

Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

Sep 21, 2011[b]

MEP

FOMC Meeting

Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013)

Sep 13, 2012

QE 3

FOMC Meeting

Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013)

Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011)

[a] See also Woodford (2012) for a description of these events.
[b] Note: MEP denotes Maturity Extension Program.
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Figure 1: 900K+ Specifications of a Rational Expectations Structural VAR
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Note: The top chart in the left column shows the cloud of 976,144 federal funds rate responses to their own shock (with the median response in
yellow). The rest of that column shows black clouds of puzzling responses of inflation, industrial production, and EBP respectively. The red dotted
lines show the median responses of these clouds of puzzles. The right column shows blue clouds corresponding to the sets of sensible responses for
each variable. The green dotted lines are the median values over the sensible set for each horizon.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Structural Shock Realizations from the Rational Expectations SVAR

Figure 3: Total Bank Reserves and the Short-Term Interest Rate

41
Source: Smith and Valcarcel (2020). The (solid) blue line denotes the rolling regression estimate of the liquidity effect obtained by regressing the
spread between the federal funds rate and the interest rate paid on reserves on a constant and the natural log of reserve balances. This estimate is
flanked by a 90% confidence interval. For this regression estimate, the date on the x-axis denotes the end point of a 208-week rolling window. The
first vertical (dashed) line corresponds with the end of the QE III period and the beginning of the Full Reinvestment phase of the balance sheet
unwind period (2014-Q3). The (dashed-dotted) vertical line in the middle of the chart acts as a line of demarcation between the Full Reinvestment
and Asset Runoff phases within the normalization period. The rightmost (dotted) vertical line denotes the end of the balance sheet normalization
period.
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The green lines connect the modal values across all responses for each horizon.

Figure 4: The solid black and blue lines represent the median and mean response across each response set.
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The green lines connect the modal values across all responses for each horizon.

Figure 5: The solid black and blue lines represent the median and mean response across each response set.
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The green lines connect the modal values across all responses for each horizon.

Figure 6: The solid black and blue lines represent the median and mean response across each response set.

Figure 7: Responses from Reduced-Form Mapping to Unconstrained Covariance Ḡ0 (A) Restriction Scheme
(Based on 1 million QR rotations. Red lines denote Cholesky Responses)
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Figure 8: Distribution of Rotated Innovations from the Covariance Restriction Ḡ0 (A)

Figure 9: Bootstrapped Responses from Overlaying (Size/Event) Shock Restrictions onto Ḡ0 (A)
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(a) column: Ḡ1 (A) = 200,101 rotations.

(b) column: Ḡ2 (A) = 65,284 rotations

Figure 10: Bootstrapped Responses from Overlaying (Event/External ) Shock Restrictions onto Ḡ0 (A)
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(a) column: Ḡ3 (A) = 215,543 rotations.

(b) column: Ḡ4 (A) = 77,407 rotations

